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1. Introduction 
The President of the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, Eric Rosengren (2010) pointed out 
that the seriousness of the recent financial crisis was underestimated by economic 
forecasters because financial links, such as provision of liquidity, to the real economy were 
“only crudely incorporated into most macroeconomic modeling” (p. 221). Adding to this, 
Borio (2013) noted that for most of the postwar period “financial factors in general 
progressively disappeared from macroeconomists’ radar screen” (p.1). However, provision 
of liquidity has become a central issue in the literature since the recent financial crisis (see 
Bridges and Thomas, 2012; Angelini et al., 2011; Naes et al., 2011; Acharya et al., 2011; 
Joyce et al., 2011; Blanchard et al., 2010; Hameed et al., 2010; Brunnermeir and Pedersen, 
2009; Borio, 2008; Adrian and Shin, 2008). Additionally, in response to the crisis, UK (and 
global) monetary policy followed an unprecedented path of interest rate cuts. UK interest 
rate cuts came to a halt in March 2009 and since then the Bank of England (BoE) base rate 
stands at a record low of 0.5%. BoE also decided to support the economy further by 
boosting liquidity. The above operation, known as Quantitative Easing (QE), consisted of 
large purchases of mainly longer-term government bonds and related assets. Between 
March 2009 and July 2012, the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) authorized a total of 
£375bn of QE. The impact of QE on the economy works via three main channels: the 
macro/policy news channel, the signaling channel and the portfolio rebalancing channel 
(see Martin and Milas, 2012, for a critical analysis). 
In this study, we examine an additional channel through which economic growth may 
be affected: the prevailing stock market liquidity conditions. There are various reasons why 
stock market liquidity can be an informative leading indicator for future economic 
conditions. Firstly, market liquidity can act as a signaling mechanism, revealing the 
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information set of investors. During periods of high uncertainty or negative outlook 
regarding the future state of the economy, investors move their capital away from high-risk 
investments, reducing their exposure or fleeing the stock market altogether, investing in 
short-term fixed income securities, preferably government debt (flight to quality or flight to 
safety). If these shifts in investors’ portfolio composition are related to fears that stock 
market liquidity may dry up, then a “flight to liquidity” is observed (Longstaff, 2004). 
These effects become more pronounced during periods of financial distress, where the 
actions of market participants, and in particular institutional investors, tend to be correlated. 
Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) show that a reinforcing mechanism between market 
liquidity and funding liquidity (the interaction between securities’ market liquidity and 
financial intermediaries’ availability of funds) leads to liquidity spirals and institutional 
investors are forced to shift their holdings towards stocks with low margins. Stock market 
liquidity can alternatively affect the real economy through an investment channel. In 
particular, a liquid secondary market can facilitate the financing of long-run projects in the 
real economy (Levine and Zervos, 1998). It is also well-established that liquidity has a first-
order effect on the premium that investors demand to withhold risky assets (see, for 
example, Amihud, 2002, and Acharya and Pedersen, 2005). As a result, a liquid stock 
market may lower the cost of capital for firms, and hence boost high return projects that 
stimulate earnings and productivity growth (Levine, 1991). 
The main contribution of this study is that it examines whether stock market illiquidity 
forecasts real UK GDP growth once other financial variables, such as the term spread (see 
e.g. Chinn and Kucko, 2010, Estrella, 2005, and Estrella and Hardouvelis, 1991), asset 
prices (see e.g. Zaher, 2007) and stock market uncertainty (see e.g. Fornari and Mele, 
2009), have been accounted for. Stock and Watson (2003) provide an extensive review of 
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the literature on forecasting macroeconomic variables, namely inflation and real output 
growth, by using asset prices in addition to monetary aggregates. Their work concludes that 
most assets (short-term interest rates, term spreads and stock returns) do not provide stable 
and strong predictive power. We build upon this strand of research by suggesting stock 
market illiquidity as an additional leading indicator of economic growth using data for the 
period 1989q1-2012q2 
In doing so, we pay attention to a particular dimension of stock market illiquidity, 
namely the price impact, which measures the resilience of stock prices to changes in trading 
activity. Blume and Keim (2012) show that illiquidity measures that attempt to estimate the 
price impact of trades do a better job at capturing liquidity, and are robust to regime 
changes such as the change in minimum tick size to decimals. Following Naes et al. (2011), 
we use the illiquidity measure of Amihud (2002), which is defined as the average ratio of 
daily absolute returns to daily trading volume (hereafter RtoV). This measure is appealing 
because it is easy to compute for long time periods given the wide availability of returns 
and trading volume data.1 RtoV is also considered to be a good proxy for trading costs and 
the depth of the market without requiring intraday data, as we need for bid-ask spreads to 
be meaningful (see Acharya and Pedersen, 2005). Additionally, we use a modified price 
impact ratio, which is defined as the average ratio of daily absolute stock returns to daily 
turnover ratio (hereafter RtoTR), essentially replacing the trading volume of a stock with its 
turnover ratio in the denominator of Amihud’s ratio (see Florackis at al., 2011, for a 
detailed analysis). 2  
                                                          
1 In addition, it is intuitively attractive because the average daily price response associated with a dollar 
of trading volume renders it a good proxy for the theoretically founded Kyle’s price impact coefficient 
(see Goyenko et al., 2009). 
2 See also Florackis et al. (2011) for the advantages of RtoV over traditional proxies of liquidity. 
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From a methodological perspective, an important contribution of our study is that it 
allows for an asymmetric relationship between liquidity and economic growth and 
ultimately links stock market liquidity to macro-liquidity provision. As Joyce et al. (2011) 
observe, central banks purchases of assets can improve market functioning when financial 
markets are dysfunctional or, in other words, when liquidity has dried up.3 In other words, 
one might expect injections of macro-liquidity to be more pronounced in periods where 
market liquidity is too low and when the economy is underperforming. This suggests a 
regime-switching model which assesses the impact of stock market liquidity on economic 
growth depending on the existence of a liquid/illiquid market regime as well as during 
different phases of the business cycle. In this study, we opt for a Smooth Transition model, 
which is able to capture regime switching behaviour in a flexible way and facilitates its 
economic interpretation (see van Dijk et al., 2002, for a discussion of the benefits of this 
class of models. To this end, our study substantially differs from Naes et al. (2011), who 
use solely linear model specifications to examine the impact of stock market liquidity on 
GDP growth in the US and Norway after controlling for the effects of other financial 
variables.  
Furthermore, we use data available to policymakers at the time of their forecasts and 
policy decisions adding realism to our models. In terms of monetary variables, we include 
either M4 or divisia money. The latter has been argued to have a closer relationship to 
expenditure, as it weighs the components of the money supply in proportion to their 
usefulness in making transactions (see Darrat et al., 2005; Hancock, 2005).  
                                                          
3 Acknowledging the considerable uncertainty of the impact of QE on the economy, Bank of England 
Deputy Governor (Monetary Policy) Charlie Bean (2012), points out that “it is possible that the 
effectiveness of policy depends on the state of the economy”. Prominent economic commentators appear 
mindful of this very issue. For instance, David Smith (Economics Editor of The Sunday Times) referred 
to QE as an emergency tool and noted that its implementation depends on whether one thinks that “this 
is an emergency or merely a period of soft growth” (Smith, 2011). 
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Our results document a statistically significant negative relationship between stock 
market illiquidity and subsequent real economic growth over and above the usual control 
variables, such as real money, term spread and global economic activity. The results also 
provide evidence that divisia money, which has a close relationship to aggregate spending, 
is a better predictor of UK growth than the routinely used M4 measure of money supply. 
Furthermore, we provide evidence that the impact of both market illiquidity and divisia 
money becomes stronger during periods of illiquid market conditions and during periods of 
(very) weak economic growth. Using a counterfactual experiment, our findings suggest that 
had market liquidity not dried up so dramatically since 2007, the depth in UK recession 
would have been less severe by some 2.3 percentage points. Finally, our out-of-sample 
forecasting analysis provides evidence in favor of a regime-switching model of illiquid 
versus liquid market conditions in predicting real UK GDP growth better than any other 
linear or non-linear model. Furthermore, using formal statistical tests, we find that this is 
the only one out of a wide range of utilized models that provides significantly more 
accurate UK GDP growth forecasts than those published in the BoE’s Inflation Report. 
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 outlines our modeling 
strategy. Section 3 provides details of the dataset used. Section 4 reports our empirical 
findings. Finally, Section 5 summarizes our findings, discusses policy implications and 
offers some suggestions for future research. 
 
2. Linear and non-linear models 
The starting point of our analysis is a linear model of the form: 
                             0t illiq t l t l t
y illiq v      X X ,                                         (1)   
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where ty  is the annual GDP growth rate, t lilliq   is a measure of stock market illiquidity, 
t lX  is a vector of control variables and tv  is an error term.
4 A large number of potential 
candidates exist for the t lX  vector of control variables.  We proceed by including in the 
vector t lX  the following control variables: lagged GDP growth, the slope of the term 
structure of interest rates (term spread), annual real money growth and a measure of global 
economic activity. The slope of the term structure is approximated by the spread between 
the yield on the 10-year UK government bond and the 3-month T-bill rate. Annual real 
money growth (i.e. nominal money growth minus the Retail Price Index (RPI) inflation 
rate) is approximated by two measures of money: broad money (M4) and divisia money. 
Global economic activity is proxied by the annual real GDP growth rate in the US.5 In 
preliminary analysis, we also included a measure of oil prices. Oil prices have been shown 
to significantly affect real economic activity in the US (see e.g. Ravazollo and Rothman, 
2013, Hamilton, 2003, Hamilton, 1996, and references therein). We experimented with the 
annual growth of the real price of oil (i.e. the annual growth in the price of oil in £ minus 
the RPI inflation rate). This variable entered all our models with a negative sign (higher oil 
prices depress economic activity) but it was statistically insignificant.6 
                                                          
4 The illiqt and tX  regressors do not need to share the same lag length l. For our empirical analysis, we 
considered lagged values up to lag 5 for both regressors. Our empirical models favor a choice of l =1 for 
both illiqt and tX based on the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC).  
5 We proxy global economic activity by US real GDP since US output is ranked 1st based on World 
Bank’s database and it accounted for approximately 23% of World’s GDP in 2011. In a VAR model of 
UK economic growth, Garratt et al. (2003) proxy global economic activity by OECD’s GDP. In 
preliminary analysis, we also considered annual real GDP growth for the OECD countries; this is highly 
correlated with US growth based on revised data (the correlation coefficient is equal to 0.89). However, 
real-time OECD GDP data are only available from 2002 onwards. Therefore, we opted for the US real-
time dataset. 
6 Alquist et al. (2011) discuss the issue of using real versus nominal oil prices in predicting real 
economic activity and Hamilton (1996) considers nonlinear transformations of the oil price. We also 
considered the nominal growth in oil prices as well as the (real) price of oil relative to its 1-year and 2-
year Moving Average. All these measures were found to be insignificant. 
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While including in the t lX  vector these commonly used predictors of economic 
growth, our study pays particular attention to the role of stock market illiquidity as a 
leading indicator of the UK business cycle. This modeling choice has been motivated by 
the channels through which stock market liquidity can affect the real economy, as discussed 
in the Introduction. To proxy stock market illiquidity ( t lilliq  ), we rely on the price impact 
ratios suggested by Amihud (2002) and Florackis et al. (2011), i.e. the Return-to-Volume 
(RtoV) and Return-to-Turnover Ratio (RtoTR), respectively, calculated for the FTSE100 
index, which contains the biggest capitalization stocks listed on London Stock Exchange. 
In particular, RtoV is defined as: 
                   


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where diR ,  is the absolute return of asset i on day d, diVOL ,  is the trading volume in 
monetary terms of asset i on day d and YN  is equal to the number of days in the examined 
window Y, while RtoTR is defined as: 
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where diR ,  is the absolute return of asset i on day d, diTR ,  is the turnover ratio of asset i on 
day d and YN  is equal to the number of days in the examined window Y. An increase in 
both measures is equivalent to a drop in liquidity; that is, our variables are measures of 
stock market illiquidity. 
Assessing the direct impact of stock market illiquidity on economic growth is not 
straightforward because stock market illiquidity is correlated with changes in monetary 
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policy. For instance, Adrian and Shin (2008), Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009), Gromb 
and Vayanos (2010) and Hameed et al. (2010), show that the relationship between changes 
in monetary policy and stock market liquidity appears to be “unevenly” or 
“asymmetrically” pro-cyclical with monetary policy, that is, expansionary (contractionary) 
monetary policy leads to smaller (larger) increases (decreases) in liquidity. We also note 
that stock market liquidity may be correlated with stock returns and stock volatility; 
liquidity tends to be lower and volatility tends to be higher during bear markets. Fornari 
and Mele (2009) pay close attention to the impact of stock market volatility on the US 
business cycle. They argue in favor of stock market volatility measures derived from 
absolute returns on the grounds that these measures are more robust to the presence of 
outliers than volatility measures derived from squared returns. We took notice of this issue 
in preliminary analysis by allowing stock market volatility to enter as a separate regressor 
in our empirical models. In particular, following Fornari and Mele (2009) we constructed 
stock market volatility measures based on the 1-year and 2-year moving average of past 
annualized absolute FTSE100 returns. Inclusion of these stock market volatility measures 
did not affect the estimates of our illiquidity proxies reported below and we failed to find 
any statistical significance for these volatility measures. 
To allow for possible asymmetries in the behavior of illiquidity, a non-linear version of 
(1) is given by: 
0 ,1 ,1 ,2 ,2( ) ( )(1 )
s s
t illiq t l t l t l illiq t l t l t l ty illiq illiq u                  X XX X ,  (4) 
where 
                                     
( ) / ( )
1
1
1
s s
t l t l
s
t l s s
e
  

 
  
 

                                 (5) 
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is the logistic transition function discussed in van Dijk et al. (2002) and t ls   is the 
transition variable. According to (4)-(5), GDP growth ty  exhibits regime-switching 
behavior depending on whether t ls   is below or above an endogenously estimated 
threshold, 
s , with regime weights st l   and (1 )
s
t l  , respectively. When t ls   is below 
the threshold 
s , then 1st l   . In this case, the impact of t lilliq   and t lX  is given by 
,1illiq  and ,1 X , respectively. When t ls   is above the threshold 
s , then 0st l   . In 
this case, the impact of t lilliq   and t lX  is given by ,2illiq  and ,2 X , respectively. In (4)-
(5), we assume a common intercept 0 , which is testable. The parameter 
s ( s > 0) 
determines the smoothness of the transition between regimes. We make s  dimension-free 
by dividing it by the standard deviation of t ls   (Granger and Teräsvirta, 1993). 
Furthermore, we choose illiquidity ( t lilliq  ) and lagged GDP growth ( t ly  ) as possible 
alternative transition variable candidates. This allows us to assess the impact of illiquidity 
during a liquid regime (when illiqt lilliq   ) as opposed to an illiquid regime (when 
illiq
t lilliq   ) and during periods of low growth (when 
y
t ly   ) as opposed to periods 
of normal or high growth (when yt ly   ). 
 
3. Data description 
Both RtoV and RtoTR are calculated for the FTSE100 index and they are expressed in 
percentage deviations from their 2-year Moving Average (MA) starting from 1989q1.7 
                                                          
7 In preliminary analysis, we also considered the level of illiquidity as well as illiquidity relative to its 1-
year Moving Average. Empirical results using these alternative measures produced similar coefficient 
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Thomson Reuters Datastream is the source for FTSE 100 daily returns, trading volumes, 
and market values. Data on M4, money divisia, the yield on the 10-year UK government 
bond, the 3-month T-bill rate and real-time vintages of GDP are available from the BoE 
database. The Retail Price Index (RPI) is available from the Office for National Statistics 
(ONS) database, whereas real-time vintages of US GDP are available from the website of 
the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia. GDP and money data are seasonally adjusted.8  
Figure 1 plots the deviations of RtoTR and RtoV measures from their 2-year MA (left 
axis) together with annual GDP growth rates based on the last available vintage of data 
produced by the ONS in 2012q2 (right axis). From Figure 1, the two measures of illiquidity 
strongly co-move. We note that stock market illiquidity, as measured by both RtoTR and 
RtoV, rises up to 20% above its 2-year MA around the 1990-91 recession. The market turns 
also illiquid during the Asian financial crisis and the Russian default in 1997-1998 and 
following the burst of the dot-com bubble, the adverse impact of which reached its height in 
2002q3 (see Berger and Bouwman, 2008). During the recent financial crisis, the stock 
market became highly illiquid. Illiquidity rises sharply in 2007, prior to the economic 
slowdown, and reaches its peak in 2008q4. It then eases between 2009 and early 2012 
(when £325bn of QE was implemented). Finally, Figure 1 superimposes a threshold value 
of -16.141% for the deviation of RtoV from its 2-year MA; we return to this issue below. 
Figure 2 plots real money growth rates based on the M4 and divisia measures of 
money, the annual US GDP growth rate based on the last available vintage of data in 
2012q2 and the term spread. We note that the recent US recession has been less deep than 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
estimates but inferior statistical fit. For this reason, the main results presented in this study are based on 
percentage deviations from their 2-year Moving Average.  
8 We have access to revised M4 and divisia money data and use these in our estimations. However, we 
note that revisions of UK monetary aggregates occur mainly as a result of changes to the seasonal 
adjustment by the ONS (Garratt et al., 2009). The US real-time GDP dataset is available from: 
http://www.philadelphiafed.org/research-and-data/real-time-center/real-time-data/data-files/ROUTPUT/ 
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in the UK and that the US economy has somewhat recovered since 2010. Moreover, if 
money divisia represents money movements in the economy more accurately than M4, one 
would expect QE injections to show up more in divisia money and less so in M4. We note 
from Figure 2 that real M4 growth reached its peak in the beginning of 2009 and has been 
falling rapidly since then. On the other hand, real divisia money increased during the first 
round of QE in 2009. It then fell between 2010 and mid 2011 and somewhat recovered 
since then. The slope of the term structure has been decreasing over the 2010-2012 period, 
which suggests that the post crisis recovery has been, at best, anemic.  
 
4. Empirical results 
4.1. In-sample analysis 
We begin by estimating, over expanding windows of data, versions of the linear model 
(1) based on the different measures of money and liquidity. The first data window runs 
from 1989q2 to 2002q4 and uses the first release of the 2003q1 real-time data vintage. Each 
successive data window is extended by one observation, and hence the last data window 
runs from 1989q2 to 2012q1 and uses the 2012q2 real-time data vintage. This setup 
delivers 38 expanding windows. 
Table 1 reports estimates of 4 versions of the linear model (1) using combinations of 
the two different measures of liquidity and money over the last vintage of data which 
covers the whole sample period 1989q2-2012q1. In all models, the impact of illiquidity is 
highly significant; an increase in stock market illiquidity is associated with lower 
subsequent economic growth; a 100 percentage point increase in the illiquidity gap 
depresses GDP growth by around 0.6 percentage points.9  The slope of the term structure is 
                                                          
9 Figure 1 shows that illiquidity movements of this magnitude and beyond have occurred since 2007. 
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also statistically significant. Divisia money is statistically significant too in columns (i) 
(iii). On the other hand, the statistical significance of M4 is much weaker; this finding 
arguably confirms the superiority of divisia money over M4 in predicting GDP growth.10 
There is some weak evidence that global economic activity, as proxied by US GDP growth, 
affects UK growth only for the model that includes RtoTR and divisia money. Amongst all 
estimated models, the model with the RtoV measure of illiquidity and divisia money in 
column (iii) delivers the best fit, since it yields the lowest AIC value.11  
To get an idea of how the in-sample performance of the estimated linear models 
evolves over succesive real-time vintages, Figure 3 plots their AIC values. From Figure 3, 
the model with the RtoV measure of illiquidity and the divisia measure of money has the 
lowest AIC value; this is more evident from 2009 onwards. In what follows, we restrict our 
attention to the RtoV measure of illiquidity and money divisia and proceed by presenting 
the results for non-linear models using these measures. In addition to the AIC values of the 
linear models of Table 1, Figure 3 also reports the AIC value of an autoregressive (AR) 
process, which we use in the following section for forecasting analysis, and two non-linear 
versions of equations (4)-(5) using RtoV and divisia money and allowing for regime 
switching behavior to depend on RtoV and yt-1, respectively.
12 We note that as we enter the 
financial crisis period, all models deteriorate in performance; nevertheless, the non-linear 
models continue to perform better than the remaining linear ones.   
                                                          
10 Using a recursive linear VAR, Garratt et al (2009) conclude that money is a weak predictor of real UK 
growth. Their analysis considers the M0, M3 and M4 measures of money but not divisia money. 
11 Using recursive estimates, unreported plots (available on request) of the residuals +/-2*standard errors 
suggest reasonable parameter constancy with the notable exception of most of the 2007-2010 period. 
12 We also estimated the non-linear model (4)-(5) using RtoTR and divisia money or M4. These 
produced an inferior statistical fit to the ones reported in Table 2. In the interest of space, we abstract 
from reporting these estimates. Full details are readily available upon request. 
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Estimates of these non-linear models based on the last available vintage of data are 
reported in Table 2. Specification (i) uses the RtoV measure of illiquidity as the regime-
switching variable, whereas specification (ii) uses lagged GDP growth (yt-1) as the regime-
switching variable. Consider first the non-linear model in Table 2(i). The estimate of the 
smoothness parameter illiq  suggests a very sharp switch from one regime to the other.13 
During the liquid regime, i.e. when illiquidity drops 16% below its 2 year MA (this 
threshold value is statistically significant), real divisia money growth has a significant 
impact on GDP growth. On the other hand, an increase in stock market liquidity does not 
have any statistical effect in this regime. However, during the illiquid regime both an 
increase in stock market liquidity and real divisia money growth are strong predictors of 
GDP growth. Market illiquidity exerts a highly significant effect; a 100 percentage point 
increase in the illiquidity gap is associated with a decline in GDP growth by almost a full 
percentage point. At the same time, the impact of real divisia money growth is twice as 
high as its impact during the liquid regime. Initially, we also allowed for regime-switching 
effects from the remaining regressors but failed to find convincing evidence. Imposing 
regime-independent effects from lagged growth, the slope of the term structure, global 
economic activity and the intercept facilitated robust convergence of the non-linear model 
and improved its statistical fit. Lagged economic growth and the slope of the term structure 
have a statistically significant impact. Global economic activity exerts a positive but 
statistically weak effect (with a t-ratio of 1.60). 
Next, we turn our attention to the non-linear model in Table 2(ii). The estimate of the 
smoothness parameter y  suggests a sharp switch from one regime to the other, whereas 
                                                          
13 van Dijk et al. (2002) note the difficulty in getting an accurate estimate of  . The likelihood function 
is very insensitive to   and therefore, precise estimation of this parameter is unlikely. 
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the statistically significant estimated threshold value of 1.22% distinguishes between a 
regime of weak economic growth, since the UK economy has witnessed an average growth 
of 2.27% over our sample period, and a regime of relatively normal growth or better. 
Illiquidity effects are insignificant when lagged annual GDP growth rate exceeds the 1.22% 
threshold. On the other hand, real divisia money growth exerts a statistically significant 
impact. However, during periods of weak economic growth (i.e. below 1.22%), stock 
market illiquidity exerts a strong impact on economic growth (i.e. 10 times bigger) and, at 
the same time, the effect of real divisia money growth doubles in magnitude. Lagged 
economic growth and the slope of the term structure have a significant impact, which is 
invariant to the state of the economy, whereas global economic activity has a statistically 
weak effect (with a t-ratio of 1.35). We also note that the non-linear model using RtoV as 
the transition variable (Table 2(i)) delivers a lower AIC compared to the non-linear model 
in Table 2(ii) and the linear models in Table 1 (see Figure 3). Furthermore, both models 
presented in Table 2 exhibit parameter constancy. The related test is reported in the last row 
of this table. 
Our use of expanding windows of data and successive real-time vintages allows us to 
examine how policy perceptions about the drivers of GDP growth evolve over time. This is 
because the release of additional data together with data revisions trigger re-estimation of 
empirical models. We demonstrate this in Figure 4, which gives an idea of how the use of 
expanding windows of data and successive real-time vintages affect the estimated 
coefficients and the confidence intervals of market illiquidity, divisia money, global 
economic activity and the slope of the term structure, derived from the linear model in 
Table 1 (iii), which has the best in-sample fit amongst all linear models. As the financial 
crisis kicks in, the impact of real divisia money growth increases. Stock market illiquidity 
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has a statistically significant and rising impact from 2009 onwards. Quite strikingly, the 
coefficient on global economic activity is statistically significant only until 2011q3. 
Between 2009 and 2011q3, global economic activity has a rising impact which then drops 
in size and significance at the same time when divisia money and illiquidity effects become 
stronger. Finally, the coefficient of the slope of the term structure is fairly stable and always 
significant. From Figure 4, re-estimation of the empirical model based on the release of 
additional data delivers the message that monetary, liquidity and global economic activity 
developments are all important drivers during the 2008-2009 UK recession and the 
subsequent short-lived recovery, whereas global economic conditions appear to weigh less 
towards the end of the examined period. 
To save space, we abstract from providing plots of the parameter estimates of the non-
linear models over expanding windows and successive real-time vintages. With the 
exception of the parameter estimate on the global economic activity, which remains as in 
the case of the linear models statistically significant only until 2011q3, these plots 
corroborate to a large extent the results of Table 2 and they are available on request.  
To assess the regime-switching impact of stock market illiquidity on UK GDP growth, 
we restrict our attention to the non-linear model in Table 2(i), which delivers a better 
statistical fit in terms of AIC. Using the estimates in Table 2(i), Figure 5 plots together the 
annual UK GDP growth rate and the regime-switching impact of illiquidity calculated as 
,1 1 ,2 1(1 )
illiq illiq
illiq t illiq t      . Compared with the estimates of the linear models 
reported in Table 1, our non-linear model reveals a more subtle response of GDP growth to 
stock market illiquidity. The impact switches from zero during liquid market conditions 
(i.e. when illiquidity fluctuates below the estimated threshold; see Figure 1) to -0.009 
during illiquid market conditions. In the latter case, the lack of liquidity takes its toll on the 
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economy dragging GDP growth down; this is indeed notable during the 1990-1991, 2008-
2009 and 2011q4-2012q1 recessions and to a much lesser extent during the 1997-1998 
Asian and Russian crises and the burst of the dot-com bubble in the early 2000s. 
To further assess the implications of our non-linear model estimates in Table 2(i) since 
the beginning of the financial crisis in 2007q3, Figure 6 compares actual GDP growth rates 
with the counterfactual GDP growth rates implied by the liquid (when 1
illiq
tilliq   ) and 
the illiquid (when 1
illiq
tilliq   ) regimes.
14 Returning to Figure 1, we note that, since 
2007q3, GDP growth was largely determined by the illiquid regime.  In fact, illiquidity 
conditions became much more severe compared with the 1990-1991 recession period or 
any other period. From Figure 6, it is apparent that the GDP growth rate implied by the 
illiquid regime is much closer to the actual growth rate than the implied growth rate from 
the liquid regime in this period. Estimates from the illiquid regime imply a recession depth 
of 7.3% in 2009q1, closely matching the 6.9% figure based on the actual data. By contrast, 
estimates of the liquid regime would suggest a much smoother fall in UK GDP, predicting 
a less severe recession depth of 4.6% with a delay of one quarter. 
What is the implication of these estimates? Had market liquidity not dried up so 
dramatically from 2007q3 onwards, the UK economy would have witnessed a substantially 
less severe recession of 2.3 (i.e. 6.9 minus 4.6) percentage points and delayed by one 
quarter. But as QE is implemented and liquidity conditions improve (from Figure 1 
illiquidity eases up between 2009-2012), the GDP growth implied by the illiquid and liquid 
regimes draw closer to each other. That said, in 2012q1, the GDP growth implied by the 
                                                          
14 Counterfactual GDP growth rates are given by 0 ,1 1 ,1 1
liquid
t illiq t ty illiq      X X  for the 
liquid regime and by
 
0 ,2 1 ,2 1
illiquid
t illiq t ty illiq      X X  for the illiquid regime. 
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illiquid regime was still tracking “better” actual GDP growth which was, nonetheless, flat.  
This, arguably, provided a valid justification for additional QE, which was eventually 
authorised by the MPC in July 2012. 
 
4.2. Forecasting evaluation 
Our expanding windows setup delivers 37 one-step-ahead forecasts of GDP growth in 
real time for all linear and non-linear models. These are compared with (i) one-step-ahead 
forecasts derived from an AR(1) model, where the AR (1) order has been selected on the 
basis of the AIC, (ii) the real-time mean forecasts published in BoE’s Inflation Report, and 
(iii) the median value of forecasts from all of the estimated models.15 Table 3 reports the 
Root Mean Squared Error (RMSE) and the Mean Absolute Error (MAE) for these forecasts.  
According to both criteria, the non-linear model with RtoV as the transition variable 
and divisia money (Model 5 in Table 3) is ranked first. The linear version of the above 
model with RtoV and divisia money (Model 3), is ranked second. The non-linear model 
with lagged growth as the transition variable (Model 6) is ranked third and the median of all 
forecasts (Model 9) is ranked fourth. According to the RMSE (MAE), BoE forecasts 
(Model 7) are ranked seventh (eighth), whereas the AR model (Model 8) is ranked last.  
We provide an out-of-sample forecast comparison of our models using the modified 
Diebold and Mariano test DM* (for more details, see Harvey et al., 1997, Diebold and 
Mariano, 1995, and the Appendix). Before turning into a detailed discussion of our results, 
we note that the literature has challenged the DM* test in two aspects. First, West (1996, 
                                                          
15 The BoE forecasts refer to the MPC’s best collective judgement of the outlook for GDP growth and 
they are available from 
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/inflationreport/irprobab.aspx. These forecasts are 
based on the assumption that the BoE base rate follows market expectations (see Britton et al., 1998). 
BoE also reports one-step-ahead predictions that assume constant interest rates over the forecast period. 
Their correlation with the one-step-ahead GDP growth forecasts based on market interest rate 
expectations is 0.99. 
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2001) and West and McCracken (1998) analyzed modification of forecast comparison tests 
in light of the use of estimated model parameters in the computation of such tests.  
However, van Dijk and Franses (2003) pointed out, that for the DM* test under quadratic 
loss, such parameter estimation uncertainty is asymptotically irrelevant. van Dijk and 
Franses (2003) went on to argue that corrections of the type suggested by West (1996, 
2001) and West and McCracken (1998) are not necessary when examining the statistical 
significance of RMSE reductions (which is precisely what we are doing in the current 
paper). Second, under the assumption that the estimation sample size and the number of 
out-of-sample forecasts tend to infinity, McCracken (2000) and Clark and McCracken 
(2001) showed that, if the underlying forecasting models are nested, the asymptotic 
distribution of the DM*-statistic is not standard normal. van Dijk and Franses (2003) noted 
that these conditions on the sample size and the number of out-of-sample forecasts 
effectively mean that expanding windows of data are used for estimation.16  
Table 4 reports the pair-wise out-of-sample forecast comparison using the modified 
Diebold-Mariano test (DM*). The first entry in cell (i,j) (for i=1,…,9 and j=1,…,9) contains 
the p-values of the DM* statistic under the null hypothesis of equal forecast accuracy of 
models i and j against the one-sided alternative that the RMSE of model j is lower. The 
second entry in (i,j) contains the p-values of the DM* statistic under the null hypothesis of 
equal forecast accuracy of models i and j against the one-sided alternative that the MAE of 
model j is lower. 
                                                          
16 On the other hand, when forecasting is based on fixed-length rolling estimation windows (something 
we also do below), Giacomini and White (2006) proved that the asymptotic distribution of the DM*-
statistic is standard normal when comparing forecasts generated by nested models. Nevertheless, it does 
not necessarily follow that this asymptotic approximation is a good one (see the discussion in Clark and 
West, 2007). 
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The non-linear model with RtoV as the transition variable and divisia money (Model 
5), which according to Table 3 is ranked first, delivers a statistically significantly lower 
MAE relative to all models. It also delivers a significantly lower RMSE relative to all 
models with the exception of Models 3, 6, 7 and 9, where we only marginally fail to reject 
the null hypothesis of equal RMSE. The non-linear model with lagged growth as the 
transition variable (Model 6), which is ranked third, delivers a significantly lower MAE 
relative to two models only (Model 2 and Model 8). With the exception of the non-linear 
model with RtoV as the transition variable and money divisia (Model 5), no other model 
delivers a significantly lower MAE relative to the BoE forecasts (Model 7). All models, 
with the exception of the BoE forecasts, deliver a significantly lower RMSE relative to the 
AR model (Model 8); when the MAE criterion is used, Model 2 and the BoE forecasts fail 
to outperform the AR model. The pooled forecasts (Model 9) constructed by taking the 
median value across the point forecasts generated by all models deliver significantly lower 
RMSE and MAE relative to Models 1, 2 and 8.17 
To visualize how well the models forecast out-of-sample GDP growth, Figure 7a plots 
the real-time GDP growth rate together with its forecasts from the two non-linear models 
(where RtoV and lagged growth as used as transition variables) and the forecasts from the 
BoE published in its Inflation Report. Figure 7b plots the real-time GDP growth rate 
together with its forecasts from of our preferred model (i.e. non-linear with RtoV as the 
transition variable-model5) and from two linear models (i.e. models 3 and 4 from Table 3). 
The forecasting performance of the estimated models appears rather similar during liquid 
                                                          
17 In a forecasting exercise based on final-time data, Kapetanios et al. (2008) consider a wide range of 
linear and non-linear models of UK growth and conclude that although individual models hardly 
outperform autoregressive (AR) forecasts, combining forecasts does improve out-of-sample 
performance. Moreover, Teräsvirta et al. (2005) find that a dynamic STAR model specification generally 
outperforms linear AR models in forecasting a series of macroeconomic variables in the G7. However, 
neither study utilizes proxies of aggregate stock market liquidity. 
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conditions and up until 2007. When growth turns negative in 2008q4, a negative outcome is 
predicted only by the two non-linear models. The non-linear model with lagged growth as 
the transition variable predicts a deeper recession compared to the other models. It also 
predicts the trough of the recession one quarter earlier than it occurred (in 2009q1 instead 
of 2009q2), whereas the remaining models forecast the trough of the recession with a delay 
of one quarter. We also note that the two non-linear models come closer than any other 
model in predicting the 0.01% real-time (flat) growth in 2012q1. 
For robustness reasons, our forecasting exercise also reports results based on a 
sequence of fixed-length rolling windows where each successive window is constructed by 
shifting the preceding window ahead by one observation. Again, our setup delivers 37 one-
step-ahead forecasts of GDP growth in real time for all linear and non-linear models. Table 
5 reports the Root Mean Squared Error (RMSE) and the Mean Absolute Error (MAE) for 
these forecasts and Table 6 reports the pair-wise out-of-sample forecast comparison using 
the modified Diebold-Mariano test (DM*). Results based on the rolling forecasts are 
broadly consistent with those based on expanding windows. The non-linear model with 
RtoV as the transition variable and divisia money (Model 5) is ranked first (see Table 5) 
and delivers a statistically significantly lower RMSE and MAE relative to all remaining 
models (see Table 6). As with expanding windows, the linear version of the above model 
with RtoV and divisia money (Model 3) is ranked second (see Table 5) according to rolling 
windows, whereas the non-linear model with lagged growth as the transition variable 
(Model 6) is now ranked fifth according to the MAE criterion and sixth according to the 
RMSE (see Table 5). From Table 6, with the exception of the non-linear model with RtoV 
as the transition variable and money divisia (Model 5), no other model delivers a 
significantly lower MAE or RMSE relative to the BoE forecasts (Model 7). For the sake of 
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brevity, we do not present here the figures that visualize how well the models forecast out-
of-sample GDP growth based on rolling windows. These figures are available upon request.  
 
5. Conclusions 
This study examines the predictive ability of stock market illiquidity with respect to 
real UK GDP growth. We focus on two measures of stock market illiquidity, namely the 
price impact ratios introduced by Amihud (2002) and Florackis et al. (2011), respectively, 
and we use data available to policymakers in real time to document a statistically 
significant relationship between stock market illiquidity and the subsequent real UK 
economic activity over and above the usual control variables, such as real money, term 
spread and global economic activity. Furthermore, our findings support the use of divisia 
money, which has a close relationship to aggregate spending, as a better predictor of UK 
growth than the routinely used M4 measure of money supply. 
We also find that the predictive ability of both stock market illiquidity and divisia 
money is regime-switching; it becomes stronger during periods of illiquid market 
conditions and during periods of weak economic growth. We provide a counterfactual 
experiment which suggests that had liquidity not dried up so dramatically since 2007, the 
depth of UK recession would have been substantially less severe by some 2.3 percentage 
points. The previous findings offer indirect support to the implementation of QE by the 
BoE. Indeed, QE, which boosts liquidity and supports monetary growth, is bound to be 
more effective in the current context of illiquid conditions and weak economic growth 
where both liquidity and monetary growth are strong leading indicators of economic 
growth. An out-of-sample forecasting exercise confirms the superiority of a regime-
switching model of illiquid versus liquid stock market conditions in predicting UK growth 
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better than any other model. In fact, this is the only model that significantly outperforms the 
forecasts published in the BoE’s Inflation Report. 
To further assess the importance of liquid versus illiquid stock market conditions for 
the macro-economy, our work can be extended to allow for regime-switching liquidity 
effects in joint estimates of output growth, inflation and the policy interest rate within a 
structural Vector Autoregressive framework. We also view the construction of global 
measures of stock market liquidity by pooling information from the US, UK and Eurozone 
stock markets as a very promising avenue for future research towards identifying a 
successful predictor of the world business cycle. 
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Appendix 
 
Diebold-Mariano (DM) and modified DM test statistic 
At forecast horizon h, this is computed by weighting the forecast loss differentials between 
two competing models i and j equally, where the loss differential for observation t is given 
by    | |   – t it t h jt t hd g e g e     , where g(.) is a general function of forecast errors (e.g. 
RMSE or MAE).  The null hypothesis of equal accuracy of the forecasts of two competing 
models, can be expressed in terms of their corresponding loss functions, 
   | |E   Eit t h jt t hg e g e       , or equivalently, in terms of their loss differential,  E   0td  .  
Let 



11 hPR
hRt
td
P
d  denote the sample mean loss differential over t observations, such that 
there are P out-of-sample point forecasts and R observations have been used for estimation. 
The Diebold-Mariano test statistic follows asymptotically the standard normal distribution: 
)1,0(
)0(ˆ2
N
P
f
d
DM d
d


 , where N (.) is the normal distribution and )0(ˆdf  is a 
consistent estimate of the spectral density of the loss differential at frequency 0.  To 
counteract the tendency of the DM test statistic to reject the null too often when it is true in 
cases where the forecast errors are not bivariate normal, Harvey et al. (1997) propose a 
modified Diebold-Mariano test statistic: 
 1
2/1
1
* )1(21







 
 P
d tDM
P
hhPhP
DM , where DM is the original Diebold and 
Mariano (1995) test statistic for h-step-ahead forecasts and t(P – 1) refers to the Student’s t 
distribution with P – 1 degrees of freedom. 
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List of Tables 
 
Table 1 
Linear estimates of Real UK GDP growth 
 Dependent  Variable: Real GDP Growth 
 
 
 
 
(i) 
Illiquidity 
measured by 
RtoTR 
(ii) 
Illiquidity 
measured by 
RtoTR 
(iii) 
Illiquidity 
measured by 
RtoV 
(iv) 
Illiquidity 
measured by 
RtoV 
Explanatory Variables     
Intercept -0.141 (-0.84) -0.064 (-0.30) -0.077 (-0.48) -0.025 (-0.12) 
GDP growtht-1  0.784 (10.72)  0.882 (12.62)  0.786 (11.22)  0.886 (13.20) 
Illiquidityt-1 -0.006 (-3.06) -0.007 (-3.42) -0.006 (-4.22) -0.007 (-4.43) 
Real divisia money growtht-1  0.104 (3.49) -  0.106 (3.72) - 
Real M4 growtht-1 -  0.031 (1.49) -  0.035 (1.74) 
Term spreadt-1  0.130 (2.86)  0.134 (2.69)  0.134 (3.10)  0.143 (2.99) 
US GDP growtht-1  0.084 (1.27)  0.032 (0.52)  0.040 (0.66) -0.014 (-0.17) 
Adjusted R2  0.88  0.87  0.89  0.88 
Regression standard error  0.77  0.81  0.74  0.78 
AIC  2.38  2.49  2.30  2.41 
Notes: This Table shows the estimates of linear models of Real UK GDP growth over the period 
1989q2-2012q1 using the last vintage or real GDP (2012q2). t-ratios are given in parentheses. AIC 
stands for the Akaike Information Criterion. 
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Table 2 
Non-linear estimates of Real UK GDP growth 
 Dependent  Variable: Real GDP Growth 
         (i)        (ii) 
Intercept  0.046 (0.28)  0.036 (0.21) 
GDP growtht-1  0.746 (11.06)   0.760 (12.47)  
term spreadt-1  0.151 (3.63)  0.134 (3.32) 
US GDP growtht-1  0.090 (1.60)  0.084 (1.35) 
 Illiquid regime of: 
1
illiq
tilliq     
Growth regime of:  
1
y
ty     
Illiquidityt-1  0.001 (0.01) -0.010 (-3.83) 
Real divisia money growtht-1  0.083 (2.15)   0.178 (4.23)  
 Illiquid regime of: 
1
illiq
tilliq     
Growth regime of:  
1
y
ty    
Illiquidityt-1 -0.009 (-5.48) -0.001 (-0.80) 
Real divisia money growtht-1  0.160 (4.62)   0.084 (2.35)  
illiq  -16.141 (-6.71) - 
illiq   99.29 (0.37) - 
y  -  1.224 (4.66)  
y  -  46.24 (0.18) 
Adjusted R2  0.90  0.90 
Regression standard error  0.70  0.71 
AIC  2.21  2.23 
Parameter constancy F-test 
[p-value] 
0.67 [0.74] 0.62 [0.78] 
Notes: This Table shows estimates of non-linear models of Real UK GDP growth over the 
period 1989q2-2012q1 using the last vintage or real GDP (2012q2). t-ratios are given in 
parentheses. Parameter constancy is an F-test of parameter constancy of the non-linear model 
which involves testing the statistical significance of the cross-product of all regressors in the 
non-linear model and time trend (see van Dijk et al., 2002).  
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Table 3 
Ranking of forecasts by RMSE and MAE criteria. Expanding windows 
 
Model i  RMSE (Ranking 
in parenthesis) 
MAE (Ranking 
in parenthesis) 
i=1 
Linear model with RtoTR and Divisia money 
 0.872  (6) 0.633 (5) 
i=2 
Linear model with RtoTR and M4 
 0.924  (8) 0.675 (7) 
i=3 
Linear model with RtoV and Divisia money 
 0.805  (2) 0.588 (2) 
i=4 
Linear model with RtoV and M4 
 0.859 (5) 0.635 (6) 
i=5 
Non-linear model with RtoV and Divisia money 
(RtoV is the transition variable) 
 0.704 (1)* 0.505 (1)** 
i=6 
Non-linear model with RtoV and Divisia money 
(lagged GDP growth is the transition variable) 
 0.820 (3) 0.592 (3) 
i=7  
BoE forecasts published in the BoE’s Inflation 
Report 
 0.885 (7) 0.689 (8) 
i= 8 
AR model 
 1.027 (9) 0.732 (9) 
i=9 
Median of all forecasts 
 0.828 (4) 0.604 (4) 
Notes: This Table reports the Root Mean Squared Error (RMSE) and the Mean Absolute Error (MAE) 
criteria of the forecasts associated with each model (from i=1 to i=9). RMSE and MAE criteria are 
based on the expanding windows one-step-ahead forecasts over the period 2003q1-2012q1. The 
ranking of each model, in terms of its forecasting accuracy, is reported in parentheses. * (**) indicates 
the models with the highest ranking based on RMSE (MAE).  
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Table 4 
 Pair-wise out-of-sample forecast comparison using the modified Diebold-
Mariano test (DM*). Expanding windows 
 
 Against Model j 
Model i 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1 
- 0.854 
0.866 
0.075* 
0.020* 
0.411 
0.525 
0.095* 
0.050* 
0.210 
0.148 
0.565 
0.746 
0.955 
0.938 
0.074* 
0.053* 
2 
0.146 
0.134 
- 0.041* 
0.029* 
0.061* 
0.031* 
0.063* 
0.025* 
0.139 
0.073* 
0.353 
0.558 
0.932 
0.855 
0.023* 
0.016* 
3 
0.925 
0.980 
0.959 
0.971 
- 0.876 
0.904 
0.123 
0.089* 
0.601 
0.551 
0.809 
0.877 
0.977 
0.974 
0.811 
0.817 
4 
0.589 
0.475 
0.939 
0.969 
0.124 
0.096* 
- 0.078* 
0.032* 
0.331 
0.197 
0.599 
0.724 
0.965 
0.934 
0.216 
0.121 
5 
0.905 
0.950 
0.937 
0.975 
0.877 
0.911 
0.922 
0.968 
- 0.891 
0.918 
0.892 
0.962 
0.966 
0.980 
0.870 
0.920 
6 
0.790 
0.852 
0.861 
0.927 
0.399 
0.449 
0.669 
0.803 
0.109 
0.082* 
- 0.757 
0.875 
0.935 
0.941 
0.547 
0.618 
7 
0.435 
0.254 
0.647 
0.442 
0.191 
0.123 
0.401 
0.276 
0.108 
0.038* 
0.243 
0.125 
- 0.834 
0.651 
0.239 
0.147 
8 
0.045* 
0.062* 
0.068* 
0.145 
0.023* 
0.026* 
0.035* 
0.066* 
0.034* 
0.020* 
0.065* 
0.059* 
0.166 
0.349 
- 0.022* 
0.025* 
9 
0.926 
0.947 
0.977 
0.984 
0.189 
0.183 
0.784 
0.879 
0.130 
0.080* 
0.453 
0.382 
0.761 
0.853 
0.978 
0.985 
- 
Notes: This Table presents pair-wise out-of-sample forecast comparisons for the 9 
forecasting models and expanding windows, at the h = 1 forecast horizon using the modified 
(DM*) Diebold-Mariano test statistic of Harvey et al. (1997).  The first entry in cell (i,j) 
contains the p-values of the modified DM* statistic of Harvey et al. (1997) for testing the 
null hypothesis of equal forecast accuracy of models i and j against the one-sided alternative 
that the RMSE of model j is lower. The second entry in (i,j) contains the p-values of the 
modified DM* statistic of Harvey et al. (1997) for testing the null hypothesis of equal 
forecast accuracy of models i and j against the one-sided alternative that the MAE of model j 
is lower. An asterisk (*) denotes statistical significance at the 10% level. i=1 refers to the 
linear model with RtoTR and Divisia money. i=2 refers to the linear model with RtoTR and 
M4. i=3 refers to the linear model with RtoV and Divisia money. i=4 refers to the linear 
model with RtoV and M4. i=5 refers to the non-linear model with RtoV and Divisia money 
where RtoV is the transition variable. i=6 refers to the non-linear model with RtoV and 
Divisia money where lagged GDP growth is the transition variable. i=7 refers to the BoE 
forecasts published in the BoE’s Inflation Report. i=8 refers to the AR model. i=9 refers to 
the median of all forecasts. 
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Table 5 
Ranking of forecasts by RMSE and MAE criteria. Rolling windows 
 
Model i  RMSE (Ranking 
in parenthesis) 
MAE (Ranking 
in parenthesis) 
i=1 
Linear model with RtoTR and Divisia money 
 0.853 (4) 0.632  (4) 
i=2 
Linear model with RtoTR and M4 
 0.984 (8) 0.712  (8) 
i=3 
Linear model with RtoV and Divisia money 
 0.806 (2) 0.592  (2) 
i=4 
Linear model with RtoV and M4 
 0.930 (7) 0.670  (6) 
i=5 
Non-linear model with RtoV and Divisia money 
(RtoV is the transition variable) 
 0.696 (1)* 0.516 (1)** 
i=6 
Non-linear model with RtoV and Divisia money 
(lagged GDP growth is the transition variable) 
 0.903 (6) 0.669 (5) 
i=7  
BoE forecasts published in the BoE’s Inflation 
Report 
 0.886 (5) 0.689 (7) 
i= 8 
AR model 
 1.101 (9) 0.751 (9) 
i=9 
Median of all forecasts 
 0.833 (3) 0.600 (3) 
Notes: This Table reports the Root Mean Squared Error (RMSE) and the Mean Absolute Error (MAE) 
criteria of the forecasts associated with each model (from i=1 to i=9). RMSE and MAE criteria are 
based on the rolling windows one-step-ahead forecasts over the period 2003q1-2012q1. The ranking 
of each model, in terms of its forecasting accuracy, is reported in parentheses. * (**) indicates the 
models with the highest ranking based on RMSE (MAE).  
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Table 6 
 Pair-wise out-of-sample forecast comparison using the modified Diebold-
Mariano test (DM*). Rolling windows 
 
 Against Model j 
Model i 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1 
- 0.905 
0.871 
0.029* 
0.011* 
0.772 
0.701 
0.034* 
0.023* 
0.648 
0.664 
0.582 
0.688 
0.983 
0.948 
0.341 
0.177 
2 
0.095* 
0.129 
- 0.032* 
0.035* 
0.040* 
0.016* 
0.009* 
0.006* 
0.262 
0.319 
0.242 
0.419 
0.875 
0.690 
0.012* 
0.009* 
3 
0.971 
0.989 
0.968 
0.965 
- 0.908 
0.887 
0.047* 
0.054* 
0.780 
0.815 
0.697 
0.799 
0.987 
0.976 
0.767 
0.622 
4 
0.228 
0.299 
0.960 
0.984 
0.092* 
0.113 
- 0.015* 
0.015* 
0.413 
0.479 
0.373 
0.568 
0.908 
0.815 
0.066* 
0.070* 
5 
0.966 
0.977 
0.991 
0.994 
0.953 
0.964 
0.985 
0.985 
- 0.971 
0.990 
0.903 
0.954 
0.985 
0.984 
0.970 
0.957 
6 
0.352 
0.336 
0.738 
0.681 
0.220 
0.185 
0.587 
0.503 
0.029* 
0.010* 
- 0.430 
0.592 
0.864 
0.759 
0.273 
0.195 
7 
0.418 
0.312 
0.758 
0.581 
0.303 
0.201 
0.627 
0.432 
0.097* 
0.046* 
0.570 
0.408 
- 0.867 
0.676 
0.348 
0.206 
8 
0.017* 
0.052* 
0.125 
0.310 
0.013* 
0.024* 
0.092* 
0.180 
0.015* 
0.016* 
0.136 
0.241 
0.133 
0.324 
- 0.014* 
0.019* 
9 
0.659 
0.823 
0.988 
0.991 
0.233 
0.378 
0.934 
0.930 
0.030* 
0.043* 
0.727 
0.805 
0.652 
0.794 
0.986 
0.981 
- 
Notes: This Table presents pair-wise out-of-sample forecast comparisons for the 9 
forecasting models and rolling windows, at the h = 1 forecast horizon using the modified 
(DM*) Diebold-Mariano test statistic of Harvey et al. (1997).  The first entry in cell (i,j) 
contains the p-values of the modified DM* statistic of Harvey et al. (1997) for testing the 
null hypothesis of equal forecast accuracy of models i and j against the one-sided alternative 
that the RMSE of model j is lower. The second entry in (i,j) contains the p-values of the 
modified DM* statistic of Harvey et al. (1997) for testing the null hypothesis of equal 
forecast accuracy of models i and j against the one-sided alternative that the MAE of model j 
is lower. An asterisk (*) denotes statistical significance at the 10% level. i=1 refers to the 
linear model with RtoTR and Divisia money. i=2 refers to the linear model with RtoTR and 
M4. i=3 refers to the linear model with RtoV and Divisia money. i=4 refers to the linear 
model with RtoV and M4. i=5 refers to the non-linear model with RtoV and Divisia money 
where RtoV is the transition variable. i=6 refers to the non-linear model with RtoV and 
Divisia money where lagged GDP growth is the transition variable. i=7 refers to the BoE 
forecasts published in the BoE’s Inflation Report. i=8 refers to the AR model. i=9 refers to 
the median of all forecasts. 
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List of Figures 
 
Figure 1 
Stock market illiquidity measures and Real UK GDP growth 
 
 
Notes: This Figure shows the time series of the two stock market illiquidity measures, Return-to-
Volume (RtoV) and Return-to-Turnover Ratio (RtoTR), as percentage deviations relative to their 
past 2-year moving averages (LHS axis) and the real UK GDP growth rate (RHS axis) over the 
period 1989q2-2012q1. The Real UK GDP growth rate is calculated on the basis of the 2012q2 
vintage data released by the Bank of England. 
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Figure 2 
Real US GDP growth, real M4 growth, real divisia money growth and term spread 
 
 
 
Notes: This Figure shows the time series of the real US GDP growth, real UK M4 growth, real UK 
divisia money growth rates and the slope of the term structure (term spread) in the UK market over 
the period 1989q2-2012q1. 
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Figure 3 
Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) over successive real-time vintages 
 
 
 
 
 
   
Notes: This Figure shows the value of the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) from estimating recursively each of the models defined in Table 1 and 
2 using successive real-time data vintages. 
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Figure 4 
Parameter estimates and confidence intervals for: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                         i. RtoV (stock market illiquidity)                                                                          ii. Real divisia money growth 
 
 
 
 
                 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
             iii. Global Economic Activity (US GDP growth)                                                  iv. Slope of the Term Structure (term spread) 
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Figure 5 
 The regime-switching impact of illiquidity on UK economic growth, 1989q2-2012q1 
 
 
 
 
Notes: This Figure shows the impact of stock market illiquidity (LHS axis) and actual real UK 
GDP growth rate (RHS axis). The impact of illiquidity is calculated as: 
,1 1 ,2 1(1 )
illiq illiq
illiq t illiq t      , with ,1illiq =0 (imposed), ,2illiq = -0.009, 
illiq = -16.141%, 
and 
illiq =99.29, based on the estimates reported in Table 2(i) for the non-linear model that 
includes the illiquidity measure RtoV and real money divisia growth and uses RtoV as the 
transition variable. 
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Figure 6 
Actual and implied regime-specific Real UK GDP growth rates since 2007q3 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: This Figure shows the actual real UK GDP growth rate along with the real UK GDP growth 
rates since 2007q3 implied by a liquid and an illiquid market regime, respectively, based on the 
estimates reported in Table 2(i) for the non-linear model that includes the illiquidity measure RtoV 
and real money divisia growth and uses RtoV as the transition variable. The model has been 
estimated using the last vintage of real UK GDP data (2012q2). 
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Figure 7 
a. One-step-ahead forecasts of Real UK GDP growth rate 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
41 
 
Figure 7 
b. One-step-ahead forecasts of Real UK GDP growth rate (cont’d) 
 
 
 
 
Notes: Figure 7a plots the real-time GDP growth rate together with its forecasts from the two non-linear models (where RtoV and lagged growth as 
used as transition variables) and the forecasts from the BoE as published in its Inflation Report. Figure 7b plots the real-time GDP growth rate 
together with its forecasts from of our preferred model (i.e. non-linear with RtoV as the transition variable) and from two linear models (models 3 and 
4 from Table 3).
 
